Two weeks ago, General Aoun made a statement that puzzled me so much that I kept thinking about it, trying to make some sense out of it. He spoke of Ta’ef and how it deprived the Christian community of its rights and how it weakened its position in the country by reducing the powers of the president.
This is understandable if we consider that Aoun would endlessly try to justify his anti-Ta’ef stand ever since 1989, even during his years in France. I still remember his speeches and statements while the Ta’ef negotiations were underway, juggling between for and against as the political climate swung daily on the basis of his chances of being elected as the next president of Lebanon. Yet his chances were never meant to be and so he went against the agreement and its ramifications, as simple as that.
To our surprise, in February 2006, he signed the memorandum of understanding with Hezbollah, forcing us to wonder what he was up to, not about the agreement’s content as much as its timing. Straight after that and during the whole months of March and April 2006 he engaged himself and his subordinates in an orchestrated effort against Saad Hariri that seemed but exaggerated and grotesque at the time.
Then came the “hiwar” Berri’s roundtable initiative. Who would participate and who should not was the daily talk for 2-3 weeks, until Aoun gesticulated on TV for 2 days promoting to what seemed to him as the most logical solution: We do not need so many representatives, it should be reduced to the true representatives of Lebanon; Nassrallah for the Shiites, Hariri for the Sunnis and himself for the Christians. What a strange way to visualize the political distribution of power, as if Ta’ef did not exist! Isn’t Ta’ef’s final objective to abolish political sectarianism?
Is today Aoun any more in agreement with Ta’ef than he was in 1989? Is there an undeclared objective behind the memorandum of understanding signed between the Tayyar and Hezbollah? Or should we say between Aoun and Nasrallah? Today we know that following his “Divine Victory,” Nasrallah is aiming for a greater share of power in Lebanon and that Ta’ef is his greatest obstacle. In Nasrallah’s views, the Shiite community is poorly represented with less than 25% of the parliament members and ministers while the Christians have 50%.
The 19-10-1 proposal offered by the 14th of March coalition addressed both calls for a representation of Aoun at the government and for securing the country from any unfavorable unilateral decision induced by the “Feltman Government.” Politically, Aoun and Nasrallah would argue that this is not good enough, however, and considering the political crisis we are in, we (the people) say that is good enough and because we are in a democratic country, then they should wait for better days to enhance their role and representation.
So what is motivating Aoun? A presidency that is meant to govern side by side with a fictive majority (or a real minority which ever way he wants to look at it) that does not want of him and lacks trust? So Nasrallah and Aoun start acting and talking like if there is no tomorrow, burning all bridges towards their political opponents, anticipating a no-continuity to the whole process like if they will not need to be talking again to the Sinioras and the Fatfats and some others.
Aoun and Nasrallah have been working very hard in rocking the boat that will ultimately lead to the renegotiation of Ta’ef in line with the strange article of the very dubious Al Dyar Charles Ayoub who suddenly brought back the long forgotten issue of federal states out of nowhere and poorly accused the 14th of March for the ownership of such a plan. Does Aoun sees himself as the leader of the Christians in a federal state side by side another federal sate for Nasrallah and another one for the Sunnis?
Now that Nasrallah has one third plus one of parliament members and ministers with no need for an additional political alliance, let us all take a guess to what will happen to: the tribunal, the implementation of 1701, the endless coexistence of the Moukawami along the Lebanese army, Syria’s recognition of its border with Lebanon, Lebanon’s privileged relationship with Syria and Iran, Lebanon’s devil relationship with the West, the Teheran-IV meeting intended to revive Lebanon economy with Iran and Syria as main donors, and last but not least the Willayat Al Fakih stronghold in one these three federal states.
Nice job, General.